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REASSESSING JURY SERVICE
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment states that "[iln all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy anid public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed."' While the Sixth Amendment clearly establishes
the right to trial by jury in criminal proceedings,2 the amendment is
less clear about the makeup of a jury. Over the years, courts have
repeatedly addressed the issues of how a jury is composed and who is
allowed, or entitled, to sit on a jury.
As a result of this attention, the composition of juries has evolved
greatly since the writing of the Constitution. For example, size
requirements have changed over the years,3 as has the use of
peremptory challenges.4 The representativeness of juries also has
changed dramatically on account of court holdings that exclusions of
particular groups of individuals are unconstitutional. Groups that
historically have been excluded from jury service include African
Americans, women, and persons of Mexican descent. The Supreme
Court has held that these exclusions are unconstitutional under either
the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments. 5
IU.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 This Note solely addresses the exclusion of non-citizens from criminal juries without
addressing the exclusion of non-citizens from civil juries.
3See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERIAN JURY SYSTEM 88-89 (2003) (discussing
the evolution from Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (holding that the Constitution
requires a jury of twelve) to Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that a jury of six
is constitutional)).
4See. e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of
the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1041, 1049-51 (1995) (discussing the former split among state courts
and federal appellate courts about whether gender-based peremptory challenges are permissible
and the Supreme Court's resolution of the matter by finding gender-based peremptory
challenges unconstitutional in J.EB. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)).
5See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that the exclusion of women
from jury service is unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Hernandez
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While the diversity of juries has increased in many respects, one
group remains regularly prohibited from jury service-non-citizens.
Eligibility requirements for both federal jury service 6 and state jury
service 7 mandate U.S. citizenship, and constitutional challenges
to statutes prohibiting non-citizens from jury service have been
unsuccessfuil.8 These restrictions affect the roughly 22 million
non-citizens living in the United States. 9 Despite these limitations,
occasionally a non-citizen will sit on a jury rendering a verdict. In
such a situation, a court will not overturn a verdict on the grounds that
the jury was not comprised solely of U.S. citizens'0 because a
defendant does not have a constitutional right to a jury composed
entirely of U.S. citizens." Therefore, jury service by non-citizens, or
at least certain non-citizens, is a possibility.
Although this Note does not directly consider whether courts
should find non-citizen exclusions from jury service unconstitutional,
it does address whether non-citizens should be allowed to serve on
juries in light of assumptions made about non-citizens and the jury's
purposes. Discussions of assumptions about certain groups and jury
roles appear frequently in cases involving exclusions of groups from
jury service, whether the groups consist of non-citizens or other
historically excluded persons. These issues are also relevant to the
policy decision of whether to allow non-citizens to sit on juries.
Part I of this Note discusses the historical and legal background of
jury service by non-citizens. Around the time of this country's
formation, non-citizens were allowed to sit on juries,'12 but today
non-citizens are widely prohibited from serving as jurors.'13 Courts
have repeatedly denied constitutional challenges, to exclusions of
non-citizens from jury service, whether brought under the Sixth
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (holding that the exclusion of persons of Mexican descent from
jury service is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that the exclusion of African Americans from jury service is
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (2006).
7See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
8 See, e.g., Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court),
summarily afd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
9See U.S. Census Bureau, United States-Selected Characteristics of the Native and
Foreign-Bom Populations, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STrable?-bm-y&-geo id
=OIOOOUS&-qr name-ACS_2006_EST 00OSO1&-ds name=ACS_2006 EST 000_ (last
visited Jan. 6, 2009).
10 See Owens v. State, 924 A.2d 1072 (Md. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1064 (2008).
1Id. at 1088-89.
12 See Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 850 (1976).
13 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (2006).
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or Fourteenth Amendments. 14  Despite statutory prohibitions of
non-citizens from jury service, courts have held that it is not
unconstitutional for a non-citizen to sit on a jury rendering a verdict.'"
Part 11 discusses the three traditional roles of the jury. For
the defendant, the jury provides protection against arbitrary
and oppressive government. 16 For the conmmity, the jury instills
public confidence in the criminal justice system. 17 For the jurors
themselves, service on the jury presents opportunities for democratic
self-government and civic education.'18  Part II explores the
implications of possible jury service by non-citizens with respect to
each role.
Part III summarizes the analysis in Par "I an looZ Iks for an answer
to the larger question of whether non-citizens should serve on juries.
While jury service by non-citizens would not diminish the ability of
the jury to fulfill any of its roles, those roles also do not uniformly
require non-citizens to be eligible for jury service. However, in
certain communities, the ability of the jury to represent the common
sense of the community-an essential component of the jury's role
for the defendant-could be enhanced by the inclusion of legal
permanent residents in the jury pool.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF NON-CITIZEN JURY
SERVICE
Jury service has not always been restricted to citizens. In England
in 1353, the privilege of a jury made up of an equal number of
citizens and non-citizens, or a jury de medietate linguae, for cases
involving a non-citizen party was granted by statute to non-citizen
merchants.19 Another statute in 1354 extended the privilege to all
non-citizens .2 0 The presence of non-citizens on English juries served
the dual functions of "improv[ing] the fact-finding capability of the
jury, but also . .. improv[ing] upon its sense of fairness by acting as a
check against prejudice.",2'1 American courts in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries followed England in providing non-citizens
on trial a jury de medietate linguae, at least into the first half of the
14 See, e.g., Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court),
summarily aftd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
15 See, e.g., Owens, 924 A.2d 1072.
16 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,411 (1991).
17 Id at 413.
Is Id. at 407.
19 LaRue, supra note 12, at 850.
20 Id
21 Id. at 852.
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nineteenth century.2 Judges in both state and federal courts granted
juries de medietate linguae upon request of non-citizens who had
been charged with crimes.2
The practice of granting juries de medietate linguae did not persist
for very long, as state courts began to find that a non-citizen's right to
a jury de mediet ate linguae no longer existed. In 1825, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Antonio 24 affirmed the denial of a
non-citizen prisoner's request for a jury de mediet ate linguae in a
two-to-one decision, with all judges writing separately. Judge Hall
affirmed the denial after finding that the jury de mediet ate
linguae in England was based on the commercial policy of
encouraging non-citizen merchants to trade in England rather than on
principles of criminal law. 2 5 Judge Henderson concurred, stating that
since the non-citizens who settle in the United States as colonists
intend to stay, their interests are not distinct from those of the other
colonists; thus, they do not require non-citizen representation on their
jury.2 In subsequent cases, other state courts also denied requests
for juries de medietate linguae, finding that state statutes prohibiting
non-citizens from being jurors had abolished any right to such a jury
that may have previously existed.2 In Kentucky, even though a
statute still provided for a jury de mediet ate linguae, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's denial of a non-citizen's request for
such a jury because the trial court had discretion in whether to grant
one as a privilege .2 ' By 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court had also found
that any past right to a jury de medietate linguae no longer existed.2
22 Id. at 850.
23 See United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Va. 1823); People v. M'Lean, 2
Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807); Respublica v. Mesca, 1 Dali. 73 (Pa. 1783). See generally
Commonwealth v. Acen, 487 N.E.2d 189, 191-93 (Mass. 1986) (discussing cases in which
judges granted juries de medietate linguae); LaRue, supra note 12, 850--54 (same).
24 11 N.C. 200 (1825).
23 Id at 205; see also LaRue, supra niote 12, at 858-59.
26 Antonio, I11 N.C. at 207 (Henderson, J., concurring); see also LaRue, supra note 12,
859-60.
27 See People v. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 597, 599 (1877) ("Juries composed in part of
denizens and in part of aliens are not known to our system of laws. The statute determines the
qualifications of jurors, and prescribes the mode of drawing and empaneling them: aliens are
expressly prohibited from serving in that capacity."); State v. Fuentes, 5 La. Ann. 427, 428 (La.
1850) ("[O]ur statutes ... enumerating . .. that the lawful juror shall be a citizen of the State,
have abolished the right to a jury, de mediatate linguae, if it ever existed in Louisiana."); see
also LaRue, supra note 12, at 862 (pointing out the state courts' brief treatment of the jury de
medietate linguae issue in these subsequent cases).
28 Wendling v. Commonwealth, 137 S.W. 205, 208 (Ky. 1911); see also Richards v.
Commonwealth, 3 8 Va. (I1I Leigh) 690, 698 (184 1) (finding, based on language of a state
statute, that courts have "a discretionary pnwer to direct juries de medietate linguae"); LaRue,
supra note 12, 860-61 (discussing the holding in Richards v. Commonwealth).
29 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936) ("Although aliens are within the
protection of the Sixth Amendment, the ancient rule under which an alien might have a trial by
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Not only did non-citizens in this country lose their right to,
or privilege of, a mixed jury composed of an equal number of
non-citizens and citizens, but eventually non-citizens were prohibited
from sitting on juries entirely. Some states had statutes restricting
jury service to U.S. citizens beginning in the nineteenth century.3
Today most, if not all, states make citizenship a requirement or
qualification for jury service.3 Most states explicitly limit jury
service to citizens in their juror qualification statutes.3 A few states
have juror qualification statutes providing that jurors must have the
qualifications of electors, and the elector qualification statutes require
citizenship.3 North Carolina, while requiring state citizenship, does
not explicitly require U .S. citizenship in its juror qualification
statute' 34 but, under the common law, status as a non-citizen is a
disqualification for jury service .35 Additionally, federal statute forbids
persons who are not citizens of the United States from serving on
district court juries .3
Both non-citizens and citizens have challenged these state and
federal statutes under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, such challenges have been unsuccessful, and courts have
repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of these statutes.
First, courts have held that exclusions of non-citizens from jury
service do not deny non-citizens equal protection. Non-citizens are
entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ,3  under which the Supreme Court held
jury de medietate linguae . .. -in order to insure impartiality-no longer obtains."); see also
LaRue, supra note 12, at 862.
30 See, e.g., Fuentes, 5 La. Ann. at 428 (describing Louisiana statutes "directing specially
how all juries shall be composed, and enumerating their qualifications, and especially that the
lawful juror shall be a citizen of the State").
31 The vast majority of these statutes specifically provide that United States citizenship is
a requirement for jury service. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-301 (2007) ("[A] person is
competent to act as a juror if the person is ... a citizen of the United states."); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-lI-lI05(l)(a) (2008) ("A person is competent to serve as a juror if the person is: (a) a
citizen of the United States. .. ). However, a few states refer to state citizenship or simply
citizenship. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4502 (West 2004) ("Every citizen of this
Commonwealth ... shall be qualified to serve as a juror. .. ); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-13-
10 (2004 & Supp. 2008) ("Any citizen of this state ... is eligible to serve as a juror."); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-337 (2007) ("All citizens ... shall be liable to serve as jurors.").
32 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (2002 & Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §
33-28-5-18 (West Supp. 2008).
33 See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.102 (West Supp. 2008); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 11.002 (West Supp. 2008).
34 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (2007).
35 SeeHinton v. Hinton, 145 S.E. 615, 615-16 (N.C. 1928).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (2006).
31 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Takashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
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"classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."3
This strict scrutiny standard requires a state to show that a
classification based on alienage satisfies a "compelling interest."39
Under this standard the Court found that state statutes denying
welfare benefits to non-citizens violate the Equal Protection Clause ,40
as do statutes requiring U.S. citizenship for registration as a licensed
engineer.4
However, after determining that classifications based on alienage
are subject to strict scrutiny, the Court later retreated and found that
under certain circumstances classifications based on alienage are only
subject to the lesser rational basis standard of review. The exception
became known as the "political function" exception, which "applies
to laws that exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the
process of democratic self-governent."42 The "political function"
exception first took shape in Sugarman v. Dougall,43 in which four
resident aliens challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
restricting competitive civil service positions to citizens."4 The Court
closely scrutinized the classification and held that it was
unconstitutional.4 However, the Court carefully limited its holding by
stating that its scrutiny of classifications based on alienage will be
less demanding when dealing with "matters resting firmly within a
State's constitutional prerogatives." The Court's establishment of
this less demanding scrutiny recognized the state's power to "exclude
aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions" and
the state's "constitutional responsibility for the establishment and
operation of its own government."4 The Court explained that it
would apply less demanding scrutiny to voter qualifications and
classifications regarding "state elective or important nonelective
executive, legislative, and judicial positions," because individuals
"who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of
38 Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (footnotes omitted).
39 Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), summarily
aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
40 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 3 76.
41 See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
601-06 (1976).
42 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984).
43 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
44 Id. at 636.
45 Id at 646.
46 Id at 648.
47 Id.
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broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of
representative governent.,A8
The Court has issued many decisions determining what sorts of
state classifications based on alienage fall within the "political
function" exception to strict scrutiny. The Court held public school
teachers come within the "political function" exception because of
their role in promoting civic virtues in students.49 Police officers and
probation officers also fall within the "political function" exception
due to the discretionary powers they have over citizens.50 However,
the Court found that lawyers do not come within the "political
function" exception, despite their access to courts and positions as
government leaders, because their profession was private and not "so
close to the core of the political process as to make [the lawyer] a
formulator of government policy."51 Notaries public also do not come
within the "political function" exception, because their clerical and
ministerial duties do not involve policymnaking or "broad discretion in
the execution of public policy.",52
As for non-citizens as jurors, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland applied strict scrutiny when faced with an equal
protection challenge to statutes disqualifying non-citizens from jury
service. In Perkins v. Smith , 3 a resident alien challenged federal and
state statutes excluding non-citizens from serving on grand and petit
juries, claiming that the statutes denied resident aliens equal
protection of the laws. Although in its analysis the district court stated
that it considered grand and petit jurors to "'perform functions that go
to the heart of representative government,"' hence placing jurors
within the "political function" exception ,5 the district court analyzed
the case through strict scrutiny, looking for a compelling interest in
restricting jury service to citizens. 55 The district court found that
resident aliens could be excluded from jury service because of the
government's compelling interest to restrict "jury service to those
who will be loyal to, interested in, and familiar with, the customs of
48 Id. at 647.
49Amnbach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979).
50 Cabell v. Chavez-salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1982) ("In carrying out [his]
responsibilities, the probation officer necessarily has a great deal of discretion. .. ); Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1978) ("[lIt would be .. . anomalous to conclude that citizens
may be subjected to the broad discretionary powers of noncitizen police officers..
51 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1973).
52 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216,225-26 (1984).
53 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), summarily affd, 426 U.S. 913
(1976).
54 Id at 137 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647).
55 Id at 136; see also Commonwealth v. Acen, 487 N.E.2d 189, 195-96 (Mass. 1986)
(stating that Perkins applied strict scrutiny analysis).
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this country.",56 The district court felt that such allegiance to this
country could not be counted upon in resident aliens as a group, and
nothing short of the taking of citizenship would be an appropriate test
for loyalty.5 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision
without opinion.5 Because "[a] summary affirmance is merely
agreement with a District Court's judgment, but not necessarily its
rationale , 59 it is unclear from the summary affirmance alone whether
the Court agreed with the placement of jurors within the "political
function" exception. However, just a few years later, the Court
suggested in dictum that classifications regarding jury service would
be subject to less demanding scrutiny.6
Some state courts, in deciding equal protection challenges to
prohibitions of non-citizens from jury service, have applied less
demanding scrutiny after finding that jurors fall within the "political
function" exception because jury service "clearly lies at the heart of
Anglo-Saxon democratic self-government. 6 1 Thus, states only need a
reasonable interest to justify the classification, and restricting jury
service to those who understand this country's government and are
loyal to this country's interests is such a reasonable interest.62 Hence,
when a court applies less demanding scrutiny to jury citizenship
qualifications after determining that jurors perform a "political
function," it can find such qualifications satisfy' equal protection
63
requirements. 'Therefore, whether considered under close judicial
scrutiny or the less demanding scrutiny provided to positions
56 Perkins, 370 F. Supp. at 138.
57 Id.
58 Perkins v. Smith, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
59 Gabriel J. Chin & Saira Rao, Pledging Allegiance to the Constitution: The First
Amendment and Loyalty Oaths for Faculty at Private Universities, 64 U. PinTr. L. REV. 431, 481
(2003) (citing Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)).
60 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (finding that police officers fall within the
political function exception). The Court stated that when a matter is a constitutional prerogative
of a state,
[tihe State need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting
classification.... Thus, it is clear that a State may deny aliens the right to vote, or to
run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political institutions. Similar
considerations support a legislative determination to exclude aliens from jury
service.
Id at 296 (citations omitted) (citing, inter alia, Perkins, 370 F. Supp. 134); see also State v.
Garza, 492 N.W.2d 32, 48 (Neb. 1992) ("[T~he U.S. Supreme Court, in Foley v. Connelie, has
acknowledged in dictum a state's right to restrict aliens from participating in the jury process."
(citation omitted)).
61 Commonwealth v. Acen, 487 N.E.2d 189, 195 (Mass. 1986).
62 Garza, 492 N.W.2d at 48.
63 See, e.g., id.
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involving a "political function," exclusions of non-citizens from juries
have been held not to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Sixth Amendment challenges to exclusions of non-citizens from
jury service have also been unsuccessful. The Sixth Amendment
provides that criminal defendants have the right to a jury trial, 6 and
the Supreme Court has interpreted this right to require "a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community."6 The purposes behind
the fair cross section requirement reflect the roles the jury fulfills, 66
and the requirement's importance is further evident from its inclusion
in the declarations of policy under the Jury Selection and Service
Act.6 1
To establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment fair
cross section requirement, a defendant must satisfy' the three-prong
test set forth in Duren v. Missouri.8 The defendant must show:
(1) a group is "distinctive" in the community; (2) the group is
underrepresented on the jury in comparison to its numbers in the
community; and (3) the underrepresentation is the result of the
group's systematic exclusion during jury selection. 69 Defendants have
not yet been able to establish that exclusions of non-citizens from
juries at both the state and federal levels constitute prima facie
violations of the requirement.
As for federal juries, courts have found that "'.it has never been
thought that federal juries must be drawn from a cross-section of the
total population without the imposition of any qualifications., 70 If a
qualification for jury service is reasonable, no Sixth Amendment
violation occurs when the group whom that qualification excludes is
not present in the jury venire.71 In United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 72
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that it was
'U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
65 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
66 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986) (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-
3 1) (listing three purposes for the fair cross section requirement). The roles the jury fulfills are
discussed in Part 11 of this Note.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) ("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes.").
68 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
69 Id. at 364.
70 United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting United
States v. McVean, 436 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir. 1971)); see also United States v. Morillo, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 105, 106-07 (D. Puerto Rico 1999) ("[Tlhere is no constitutional requirement that
juries be drawn from a cross-section of the community without imposition of any
qualifications.").
71 Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d at 976.
72 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975).
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reasonable for non-citizens to be excluded from federal jury service
because the exclusion serves the compelling interest of ensuring that
jurors are committed to this nation's laws.7 Additionally, the
exclusion is reasonable in light of Congress's plenary authority under
the Constitution "to define the extent of resident aliens' rights prior to
obtaining citizenship." 74 Hence, courts have found that no violation
of the Sixth Amendment fair cross section requirement exists when
non-citizens are excluded from federal juries.
In finding that the exclusion of non-citizens from state juries does
not violate a defendant's right to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of society, the California Supreme Court proceeded with a
different analysis. In Rubio v. Superior Court, 75 the court found that
resident aliens do not constitute a cognizable group giving rise to
Sixth Amendment concerns.7 Although resident aliens might
constitute a cognizable group due to their shared experiences of
political exclusion and exposure to discrimination, these experiences
are still represented on juries since naturalized citizens have also
suffered these burdens .77 In finding that non-citizens do not constitute
a cognizable group, the court concluded that statutory exclusions of
non-citizens from state juries do not violate the Sixth Amendment fair
cross section requirement.7
Although courts have held that prohibitions of non-citizens from
jury service are constitutional, many cases show that actual jury
service by non-citizens is not unconstitutional. Despite statutes
prohibiting their jury service, non-citizens have occasionally sat on
juries. This situation can occur if a non-citizen does not know that
citizenship is a requirement for jury service and mistakenly fills out a
juror questionnaire or is never asked or challenged about his
citizenship. In a recent Maryland case, Owens v. State'79 Mr. Alade, a
non-citizen permanent resident in the United States as a student,
served as a juror.8 When Mr. Alade filled out the juror qualification
form, he checked the box that indicated he was qualified to serve as a
juror due to an oversight.8 Soon after the jury returned its verdict
73 Id. at 976.
74 Id. at 978.
75 593 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1979).
76 Id. at 600.
77 Idat 599.
78 Id.
79 924 A.2d 1072 (Md. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1064 (2008).
90 Id. at 1078-79.
81 Id. at 1079. At a hearing held on the matter of Mr. Alade's non-citizenship, the trial
court found that Mr. Alade did not deliberately intend to mislead the court as to his citizenship
status. Id
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convicting the defendant, Mr. Alade learned that non-citizens cannot
serve on juries, and he brought his non-citizenship to the attention of
the Jury Commissioner. 82 The defendant's subsequent motion for a
new trial on the basis that he was "deprived of a lawful jury" due to
Mr. Alade's non-citizenship was denied .8
The Maryland Court of Appeals affir-med the decision of the trial
court and rejected the defendant's argument that substantive due
process protects a right to a citizen jury, pointing to several U.S.
Supreme Court cases.8 In some of the cases, the Court found that,
although a defendant can challenge the non-citizenship of a juror
prior to trial, challenge cannot be made after a verdict. 85 Another case
provides that "States remain frcc to confine the selection [of jurors]
to citizens,,86-implying that states are not required under the
Constitution to restrict jury service to citizens. Therefore, although
courts have found that the Constitution does not mandate jury service
for non-citizens, they have also held that there is no constitutional
right to a jury composed entirely of citizens and that the presence of
non-citizens on juries is not unconstitutional.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE JURY's ROLES FOR NON-CITIZEN JURY
SERVICE
Even though the widespread state and federal exclusions of
non-citizens from juries suggest a strong consensus that non-citizens
should not serve as jurors, this seeming consensus deserves
questioning. Many state and federal courts have faced and rejected
Sixth Amendment fair cross section challenges to non-citizen jury
service prohibitions, but the Supreme Court has never addressed such
a challenge. As for challenges based on equal protection, in
Perkins v. Smith 87 the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of such a
challenge by a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland, but did so without opinion-a summary
affirmance that carries limited precedential weight.88
82 Id at 1078.
83 Id at 1079.
84 Id at 1088-89 (citing Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970); Kohl v.
Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 300 (1895); Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291, 297-98 (1891);
Hollingsworth v. Duane, 4 U.S. (4 Dali.) 353 (1801)).
85 See Kohl, 160 U.S. at 302; Hollingsworth, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 353.
86 Carter, 396 U.S. at 332; see also Jugiro, 140 U.S. at 297 ("[S]ervice upon grand and
petit juries in the courts of the several states may be restricted to citizens of the United States.").
87 426 U.S. 913 (1976), summarily afflg 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge
court).
88 See Chin & Rao, supra note 59, at 481-82 ("Because of the diminished weight
accorded to summary affirmances, as Chief Justice Burger explained, 'the Court has not
hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have
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This Note will not address the constitutionality of statutes
excluding non-citizens from jury service. Instead this Note addresses
whether, in light of the finding that the presence of non-citizens on
juries is not unconstitutional, there are policy reasons to allow some
89non-citizens to serve as jurors.
These policy reasons cannot be addressed outside of the greater
framework of the meaning of jury service in the United States. Only
in light of the jury's role can one consider whether some non-citizens
should be included in, rather than excluded from, jury service. This
analysis is also appropriate since statements and reflections on the
jury's role have been frequently included in cases concerning jury
selection procedures.
However, deciphering the jury's role is "not a straightforward
task."90 This statement seems an accurate assessment since the jury's
role consists not of one single purpose, but of a collection of many
different purposes. Although the Sixth Amendment frames the jury
trial in criminal proceedings as a right of the accused,91 the jury trial
is widely recognized as having functions beyond such protection. The
jury trial has important roles and benefits for the jurors and
community as well as for the criminal defendant. 9 2 Not only does the
jury have several recognized roles, neither these roles, nor the manner
in which the jury serves these roles, have remained static throughout
this country's history.93 In addressing whether some non-citizens
should serve on juries, one must determine whether the jury trial's
current meanings for the defendant, the community, and the jurors are
best served by allowing or barring aliens from jury service.
established."' (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring))).
99 This Note's discussion of policy concerns may raise some issues that could lead to the
questioning of the constitutionality of statutes excluding non-citizens from jury service.
However, the constitutionality of these statutes is likely secure because of the government's
concern for definting the political community. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 648
(1973).
90 Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 46 (2003).
91 U.S. CONST. amend. V1 ("[Tihe accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury. .. )
92 Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 Am. U. L. REv. 65, 118
(2003) (stating that jury trials "are beneficial for society, litigants, and the jurors themselves");
see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) ("Discrimination in jury
selection . .. causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are
wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process.").
93 See, e.g., Matthew P. Hanrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury,
1999 Wis. L. REv. 377, 377 (explaining that although current doctrine posits that judges
determine the law and juries apply the law and determine fact, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries it was believed that the role of the jury was to find both fact and law).
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A. The Role of the Jury for the Criminal Defendant
The main purpose of the jury trial for the criminal defendant, often
recognized in Supreme Court jurisprudence, is to serve as a protection
against arbitrary and oppressive government .9  This role as a check on
power was clearly exhibited during the late eighteenth century when
colonial juries in certain cases resisted the British government's
tyrannical laws by refusing to convict defendants who had violated
the laws.95 Even after this country achieved independence and formed
a democratic, representative government, jury trials were still
considered a necessary protection against government power. 9
Although the protection. the jury provides IS no longer Lieced at a
distant monarch, the protection is characterized as a check on
prosecutors and judges.9
A determination of whether the current exclusion of non-citizens
from juries is compatible with the protective role that juries are
supposed to maintain for a criminal defendant requires consideration
of the ways in which juries perform this role. Juries historically
fulfilled the role of a check against arbitrary governmental power
through their law-determining function and representation of the
community in which the crime was committed. 9 8
1. The Decline of the Jury's Law-Finding Function and the Current
Limitation to Fact-Finding
Juries were historically a strong check on government because
they could "decide the law as well as the facts in criminal cases." 99
This ability and power arose partly out of necessity. Colonial judges
did not have much formal training and often did not instruct the jury
about the law.100 Eighteenth-century lawyers recognized the
law-finding function of the jury and would often argue the law
94 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 510
n.7 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968);
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965).
95 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 23-25 (1994); JONAXAIT, supra note 3, at 23-24.
96 JONAKAIT, supra note 3, at 24-27.
97 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (describing the jury as "an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge");
JONAKAIT, supra note 3, at 29-35 (discussing the reasons for the need for juries as a safeguard
against judges).
98 ABRAMSON, supra note 95, at 25 ("[Jlury trials gave local residents, in moments of
crisis, the last say on what the law was in their community.").
99 Barkow, supra note 90, at 48-49.
10 Harrington, supra note 93, at 379.
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directly to the jury.10' Additionally, in trials presided over by more
than one judge, each judge would instruct the jury as to his
interpretation of the law.'102 If the judges' instructions conflicted, the
jury would necessarily have to choose one of the views in reaching its
verdict.103 The Supreme Court also recognized the ability and power
of the jury to decide the law, even if the judges agreed upon and
instructed the jury on one applicable law.1l4 In Georgia v.
Brailsford,'05 Chief Justice John Jay instructed the jury, "[Ylou have
nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves ... to determine the law
as well as the fact in controversy."0
However, during the nineteenth century judges began to curb
juries' law-finding function by instructing jurors that they could apply
only the law stated in the charge the judge provided. These limitations
were motivated by three factors. First, judges desired stability in the
law. Second, judges felt that the increasing diversity of juries meant
that juries did not always represent a common set of community
beliefs. Lastly, judges saw the increased legal education for judges
and lawyers as support for the view that judges, rather than juries,
should hold the law-finding function.107  The Supreme Court
considered the law-finding function and nullification power of juries
in 1895 in Sparf v. United States' 08 and held that the duty of juries
was to make findings of fact and then apply to those facts the law the
court declared to them.' 09 Thus, the Court clearly rejected the idea
that juries have a right to make decisions of law or to nullify the law.
Despite this holding, jury nullification can still occur, because
even though the Court held that juries do not have the right to nullify
the law, juries still have the ability and power to do so." 0 This ability
arises because the jury in a criminal trial issues a general verdict,
which compounds the jury's finding of law and fact-a verdict of
101Id at 378.
102 JONAKAT, supra note 3, at 246.
103 Id.
104Id (citing Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 1, 4(1794)).
1053 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1 (1794).
106Id at 4.
107 Harrington, supra note 93, at 3 80.
108 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
'09Id. at 102. The Court declared:
[Iun the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the
law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the
evidence. Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law, upon the jury,
the responsibility of applying the law so declared to the facts as they, upon their
conscience, believe them to be.
Id
110 Harr'igton, supra note 93, at 434.
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acquittal could possibly be the result of a jury's nullification of the
law."' This nullification is "unassailable" due to the "Constitution's
protection against double jeopardy. 1 12  Despite this fact, some
scholars suggest that actual events of jury nullification are most likely
rare. 113 Few individuals in the jury pool know of the jury's ability to
nullify the law, and courts have decided that jurors should not be told
about their power of nullification." 4 Additionally, the convictions
imposed by criminal juries in the majority of cases and interviews
with both judges and jurors suggest that jury nullification is not
widespread." 5
This decline of jury nullification, in addition to Sparf s rejection
of the jury's right to decide mattcrs of law, indicates that a jury's
law-finding function is no longer an important element of the jury's
role as protector against oppressive governmental power. Therefore,
instead of a determination of whether jury service by non-citizens
is compatible with the historical function of juries to determine the
law, the question becomes one of addressing any concerns about
non-citizens' performance of the jury's job to decide issues of fact
and apply the law, as instructed by the judge, to those facts.
One reason often advanced for prohibiting non-citizens from jury
service is doubt as to whether non-citizens have the loyalty, interest,
and familiarity with the customs and laws of the United States
necessary to perform jury service.1 16 This perception raises the
question of whether jury service by non-citizens is compatible with
the jury's limitation to engage only in fact-finding without making
any findings of law. One could claim that since non-citizens are less
likely to have an extensive knowledge of or commitment to the
customs and laws of this country, they may be more likely to
disregard or misunderstand the law directed by a judge and decide
M IId.
112Id The Fifth Amendment states: " Nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... "U. S. CONST. amend. V.
113 See JONAKAIT, supra note 3, at 258.
114 Jd at 254-5 5.
115Id at 258.
116 SeUnited States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 976 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]here [i]s a
compelling interest 'in ensuring that persons who serve as jurors are personally committed to
the proper application and enforcement of the laws of the United States' which therefore
justifies the exclusion of aliens." (quoting Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 142 (D. Md.
1974) (three-judge court) (Winter, J., concurring), summarily aff'd. 426 U.S. 913 (1976)));
Perkins, 370 F. Supp. at 138 ("There is no ... basis for assuming that resident aliens. ... have so
assimilated our societal and political mores that an equal reliance could be placed on their
performidng as well as citizens the duties of jurors in our judicial system."); Commonwealth v.
Acen, 487 N.E.2d 189, 196 (Mass. 1986) ("[Jlury service demands loyalty to this country and
its laws as well as knowledge of and familiarity with its customs. . .. [I]t is undeniable that
some aliens do not possess these requisite attributes ... "(citations omitted)).
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verdicts according to their own understanding of what the law is or
should be. However, this broad claim based on a broad assumption is
weakened by a variety of arguments.
First, case law involving situations in which non-citizens have
served as jurors suggests courts are not greatly concerned that
non-citizen jurors would purposefully ignore the law as instructed by
a judge or that a lack of knowledge of the law would result in such a
disregard.'117 Findings of law by a jury potentially can take two
different forms: the jury can ignore the law directed by a judge either
to acquit a guilty defendant or to convict a defendant whom the jury
believes is innocent of the alleged crime. The first form is referred to
as jury nullification. 18While juries have the ability, if not the right, to
nullify the law in order to acquit, some scholars "stress that the jury
does not have the power to ignore the law in order to convict" in
reality because a judge can set aside guilty verdicts (but not
acquittals)." 9 A conviction in disregard of the law compromises the
role of the jury in preventing oppression, because an appeal requires
additional expenses in time and money for the defendant, while "few
appeals are successful."'120 For these reasons, even though a guilty
verdict is appealable, the harms resulting from law-finding that takes
the form of convictions in disregard of the law are potentially worse
than harms from law-finding resulting in acquittals in disregard of the
law.' 21
If this is the case, and if the assumed lack of knowledge and
loyalty of non-citizens truly affects the likelihood that non-citizens
will apply the law instructed by the judge, one would expect courts to
frequently reverse verdicts of conviction when a non-citizen sits on
the jury rendering the verdict. However, again and again courts faced
with defendants' post-conviction objections to the non-citizenship of
a juror find that the presence of a non-citizen juror on the jury is not
grounds for reversal of the verdict.12 2 In one such case, the defendant
specifically argued that a non-citizen is less likely to be familiar
with local laws and Customs. 123 However, after addressing many
considerations, including whether the non-citizen juror applied the
117 See cases cited supra note 84.
'
1 8 JoNKIT, supra note 3, at 245.
119Id. at 263.
120Id. at 265.
121 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing "a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free").
122 See, e.g., Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895); Owens v. State, 924 A.2d 1072 (Md.
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1064 (2008).
123 Moton v. State, 569 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
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law as directed by the trial court, the appellate court affirmed the
conviction, finding that none of the defendant's constitutional rights
were violated. 24 Therefore, although lack of familiarity with,
knowledge of, or loyalty to this country's law and customs is
advanced as a reason to deny non-citizens the opportunity to serve on
juries, courts have not used this reason to reverse verdicts of
conviction when non-citizens have served as jurors.
Second, the specific assumption that non-citizens lack the
necessary knowledge of the law to perform as jurors should not alone
support non-citizens' exclusion from jury service, especially
considering the typical knowledge of citizens who serve as jurors.
The law's numerous complexities foster mnuch- doubt as to ordinary
citizens' capacity to know and understand the law.125  These
complexities represent one of the initial reasons for assigning the
judge the law-finding function while limiting the jury to questions of
fact.'126 Jurors are not required to seek out or know the law to apply in
a particular case; instead, jurors receive their knowledge of the
applicable law from the judge's instructions.127 Even when presented
with the applicable law through the jury instructions, jurors will often
not understand that law.'128 Thus, an assumption that non-citizens lack
knowledge of the laws of the United States should not alone support
prohibitions of non-citizens from jury service; citizens also lack
comprehensive knowledge of this country's laws, and jury
instructions often contribute to confusion about the law rather than
clarify any minimal understanding.129
Third, the assumption that non-citizens lack knowledge of and
loyalty to the laws and customs of the United States may not
accurately represent non-citizens as a class and certainly cannot be
said to accurately represent every individual non-citizen. As various
scholars note, "United States citizenship is a weak correlate of actual
allegiance, or loyalty." 30 In Perkins, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland recognized that "many, if not most, aliens do
intend to become citizens, and . .. their loyalty could probably be
1241d. at 267.
1
2 5 ABRAMSON, supra note 95, at 9.
126 Id.
127 JONAKATT, supra note 3, at 198.
128Id
129 Of course, unclear jury instructions that do not remedy jurors' initial lack of knowledge
about applicable law represent a problem of the jury system requiring attention. For a discussion
about the jury instruction process and possible reforms, see JONAKAIT, supra note 3, at 198-
217.
130 Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279, 295 (1994) (citing
Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: WhyNot the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1092, 1125-35 (1977)).
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counted upon."'13 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that 'jury
competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter."132
However, the district court in Perkins rejected the possibility that any
sort of screening, prior to the taking of citizenship itself, could show
the allegiance of a non-citizen to the laws of the United States.13 3
Possibilities exist, however, for determining the knowledge of and
commitment to the laws by individual non-citizens.
Residency status of non-citizens could act as a vehicle for
determining their knowledge of customs and commitment to the laws.
Non-citizens who are legal permanent residents could be given the
opportunity to serve on juries. As of September 2004, an estimated
11.6 million legal permanent residents were living in the United
States, and 8.0 million of these legal permanent residents were
estimated to be eligible for naturalization.134 As a legal permanent
resident, a non-citizen is allowed to live and work in the United States
permanently.135 Legal permanent residents must pay local, state, and
federal taxes, are able to "serve in the military and are eligible for the
draft," and are subject to federal, state, and local laws.13 6 A legal
permanent resident's ability to serve in the military is particularly
relevant to the question of whether this class of non-citizens should be
able to serve as jurors. If legal permanent residents are deemed loyal
enough to fight for the United States, they should be considered
sufficiently committed to the laws of this country to serve as jurors
and apply the law as instructed by the judge.13 7
Even if doubts remain about the loyalty to this country's laws of
legal permanent residents as a group, there are still other methods
available to determine if certain subgroups of legal permanent
residents possess the requisite loyalty to the laws necessary to
131 Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), summarily
aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
132 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
133 See Perkins, 370 F. Supp. at 138.
134 NANCY F. RYTINA, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION AND POPULATION ELIGIBLE To NATURALIZE IN 2004, at 3
(2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/Publications/LPRest2004.pdf.
135 KELLY JEFFERYS & RANDALL MONGER, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2007, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/LPRFR_2007.pdf; Gabriela Evia, Note, Consent by All the Governed.-
Reenfranchising Noncitizens as Partners in America's Democracy, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 151
(2003).
136 Evia, supra note 135, at 151-52.
137 Teobligations of legal permanent residents to the United States have also been cited as
reasons for extending the vote to non-citizens. See Jamnin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens Local
Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Suffr'age, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1391, 1441-42 (1993) (arguing that resident aliens should be able to vote at local level);
Evia, supra note 135, at 15 1-53 (arguing that legal permanent residents should be able to vote at
national and local levels).
742 Vol. 59:3
2009] REASSESSING JURY SERVICE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS 743
perform the juror's task. For instance, legal permanent residents who
have applied for U.S. citizenship could be included as jurors. In fiscal
year 2007, legal permanent residents filed 1.4 million applications for
U.S. citizenship.13 8 By filing for citizenship, these legal permanent
residents indicated their desire and commitment to live in this
country. Also, to file for citizenship these legal permanent residents
must have resided in the United States for at least five years since the
date they were lawfully admitted for permanent residence.139 This
length of time allows development of the commitment to and
knowledge of the laws necessary for service as a juror who accepts
and applies the law the judge provides.
Alternatively, courts could determine individual legal permanent
residents' commitment to the laws. Such determinations could take
the form of oaths and questioning similar to those that are already
used in jury service. For example, judges could question potential
jurors about whether they will apply the law as instructed, and, if a
potential juror indicates that he might not apply the law as instructed
because of his personal conscience, the judge could excuse that
person.'140 Other possibilities include oaths that a juror will uphold the
Constitution and laws.'14'1 Thus, multiple ways exist to ascertain if
non-citizens possess the knowledge of and loyalty to the laws of this
country necessary to perform the jury's function of finding facts and
applying the law as instructed by the judge to those facts. 142
2. A Jury Drawn From the Community to Represent the Common
Sense of the Community
The second characteristic of juries that contributes to the jury's
role of protecting the criminal defendant against oppressive
government is the jury's composition of members of the community
in which the crime was committed. What it means to be a jury drawn
from the community has evolved over time. Before the colonies
achieved independence from the British government, the power of the
jury to protect criminal defendants from the British government's
tyrannical laws depended on juries being drawn from the local
138 Julia Preston, Surge Brings New Immigration Backlog, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 2007, at
A26.
1 39 See 8 U. S.C. § 1427 (2006).
140Se Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern
Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 986 (2006) (citing FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR
U.S. DISTRicT COURT JUDGES 93 (4th ed. 1996, rev. 2000)).
141 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 213:20-18 (West 2009).
142 In Part 111, this Note attempts to answer the question of whether non-citizens should sit
on juries. In doing so, it finds that in certain locations, legal permanent residents should be
eligible to serve as jurors. See infra Part Ill.
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population of the colonies.14 3 During the framing of the Constitution,
the argument for maintaining the local nature of the jury centered on
the importance of a jury's representation of a community's common
sense.'44 When the Bill of Rights was drafted, the Sixth Amendment
maintained the local nature of the jury with the requirement of a "jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed"
for all criminal prosecutions.14 5
In the last century, while the commitment to juries drawn from the
community in which the crime was committed has remained strong,146
the focus in cases involving jury selection has shifted to how the jury
is drawn from the community. In Taylor v. Louisiana,147 the Supreme
Court emphasized its oft-repeated finding that "the selection of a petit
jury from a representative cross section of the community is an
essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."148
The Court discussed how the common sense of the community acts as
a guard against the exercise of arbitrary power by the government,
and this protection mechanism cannot be realized fully "if the
jury pooi is made up of only special segments of the populace or
if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the [jury] pool."'14 9
A representative jury is necessary to maintain "'a diffused
impartiality. ""'0 Therefore, in order for the jury, by embodying the
common sense of the community, to fulfill its role of protecting the
criminal defendant against arbitrary and oppressive government, the
jury must not only be drawn from the community in which the crime
was committed, but also be widely representative of that community.
In order for a jury to most fully represent the common sense of the
community, one would expect that members of most or all groups
should be eligible for jury service. However, a limit for this wide
inclusion might be justified if the presence of members of a certain
group on a jury actually decreases the ability of the jury to represent
the common sense of the community. For non-citizens to constitute
such a group, their presence on a jury must cause the jury to no longer
143 ABRAMSON, supra note 95, at 25.
144Id. at 28.
145 U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
146But see generally JONAKAIT, supra note 3, at 112-13 (discussing venue changes).
1~449 U.S. 522 (1975).
148 Id. at 528.
1491d at 530; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 n.8 (1986) ("By compromising
the representative quality of the jury, discriminatory selection procedures make 'juries ready
weapons for officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered among
unpopular or inarticulate minorities."' (quoting Akins v. Texas. 325 U.S. 398. 408 (1945)
(Murphy, J., dissenting))).
150 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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represent the common sense of the community, thereby no longer
being capable of fulfilling its role of protecting the defendant from
oppression and partiality.
To represent the common interest of the community, members of a
jury must have knowledge of the customs and values of the
community. In Perkins, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland emphasized the importance of a juror having knowledge of
the "customs of the locality" and stated that no assumption that
resident aliens have this knowledge could be made. 15 1 Even so, legal
permanent residents could be eligible for jury service without harm to
the jury's characteristic of representing the community's common
sense. Most legal pc.-uia.nnt residents must be residents of the Unite
States for five years prior to being eligible for naturalization. 152
Therefore, the estimated 8.0 million legal permanent residents who
are eligible to naturalize have lived in this country for at least five
years. 153 Even accounting for interstate and interdistriet migration,
which also occurs among citizens, a strong probability exists that
many legal permanent residents have lived in a particular community
for many years. These legal permanent residents could have a closer
connection to their community and more opportunity to gain
knowledge of the community's interests and customs than even a
citizen who is a new resident of the community. Since the citizen who
is a newcomer to town may be called for jury service while the legal
permanent resident who has developed ties to the community over
many years may not be called, citizenship classifications seem an
arbitrary measure of an individual's knowledge of a community, and
hence his or her ability to sit on a jury representing the common sense
of that community.
The Supreme Court has been critical of similar arbitrary
restrictions in the past. In Dunn v. Blunistein,154 the Court found that a
one-year residency requirement for voter eligibility could not be
justified on the basis of a government desire for an electorate
knowledgeable about community is sues. 155 The Court found the
durational residency requirement too crude a measure of knowledge
since some new residents may be more informed about community
issues than long-time residents. 156 This finding supports a theory that
"I' Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), summarily
aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
'
52 RYTII4A, supra note 134, at 2.
153 See id.at 2-3.
'154 5 U.S. 330 (1972).
1551d. at 356-57.
156Id. at 357-58.
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general bans of non-citizens from jury service should be reconsidered
because of their arbitrary nature.15 7 Since most legal permanent
residents have likely lived in the same community for many years,
they have an opportunity to become acquainted with local customs
and values on par with that of citizens. Their presence on juries
will maintain the jury's representation of the common interest of the
community, while potentially enhancing community representation
on the jury. 15 8 Therefore, the presence of at least certain groups of
non-citizens on juries is compatible with the role of the jury as a
guard against government oppression and partiality.
B. The Role of the Jury for the Community
The jury plays an important role for the community as a whole by
instilling public confidence in the criminal justice system. The
Supreme Court described a purpose of the jury system as "to impress
upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a
verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law
by persons who are fair." 159 The manner of jury selection will greatly
impact whether community members believe a jury verdict is fair and
whether community members are confident in the entire judicial
process.160 Jury selection procedures do not need to result in actual
bias for community members to lose confidence in the jury system; an
appearance of bias or an increase in the risk of actual bias is sufficient
to create a loss of confidence.161
Exclusions of certain groups during the jury selection process can
diminish public confidence in the institution of the jury and the
criminal justice system as a whole for two different reasons. First,
loss of confidence in the judicial system is inevitable if the exclusion
involves discrimination that violates equal protection of the law and
contributes to "the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes." 62
157 in contrast to the invalidity of a one-year residency requirement for voting, the validity
of a one-year residency requirement for jury service has been upheld. See, e.g., United States v.
Ross, 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1), which requires a
one-year residency in the district for federal jurors, is constitutional). However, in jurisdictions
in which there are durational residency requirements, an additional restriction on non-citizens is
not needed because non-citizens will already have the same opportunity to learn the customs of
the community as citizens do.
158 Legal permanent residents, rather than all non-citizens, constitute the group that Part III
of this Note proffers should be allowed to serve on juries, at least in some locations. See mnfra
Part 111.
159 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,413 (1991).
160See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) ("Illegal and unconstitutional jury
selection procedures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process.").
161Id. at 502-03.
162 J.EB. v. Alabama er reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
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Second, exclusion of a group from jury service can create a loss of
confidence in the judicial system if the exclusion systematically
produces a jury that is less representative of the community. 163 If the
exclusion of non-citizens from jury service decreases public
confidence in the jury system for either of these reasons, non-citizens
should be allowed to serve on juries. In determining whether there is a
decrease in public confidence, one must look not only at the effects of
non-citizen exclusions on non-citizens themselves, but also at the
effects on other groups.
1. Equal Protection as a Concern for Community Confidence in the
Jury System
The exclusion of non-citizens from jury service could create a loss
of public confidence in the judicial system if the exclusion is deemed
to be invidious discrimination. Relevant to this determination are
equal protection decisions concerning exclusions of other groups
from jury service and various equal protection cases involving non-
citizens. "[N]o court has ever held that . . . jury service is a
fundamental right entitled to strict or even heightened scrutiny.1164
Therefore, whether exclusion of a certain group is likely to be
considered invidious discrimination by the state will depend in part
on whether that group is viewed within the equal protection
framework under heightened scrutiny. Classifications based on race
and national origin are inherently suspect and deserve close judicial
scrutiny.165 The Supreme Court has found that jury service exclusions
based on both of these classifications violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 166 The Court has also held that classifications based on
alienage are inherently suspect and deserve close judicial scrutiny,
because "[alliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and
insular' minority. 167 This view of non-citizens as a class makes it
1
63 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986) (stating that one of the purposes
of the fair cross section requirement is to maintain'public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system"'. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975))).
164Kalt, supra note 92, at 88 (citing United States v. Onant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 10 15, 1020
(E.D. Wis. 2000)).
165 Grahami v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing, inter alia, McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 19 1-92 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948)
(national origin)).
166See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) ("[Petitioner's] only claim is the
right to be indicted and tried by . .. juries selected from among all qualified persons regardless
of national origin or descent. To this much, he is entitled by the Constitution."); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (finding that a statute prohibiting African Americans
trom serving as jurors "amounts to a denial ot the equal protection of the laws").
167 Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
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highly likely that exclusion of this group from jury service conflicts
with the jury's role of instilling public confidence in the judicial
system. However, unlike exclusions from jury service that courts
have rejected for other groups subject to strict scrutiny, exclusions of
non-citizens from jury service have been upheld.16 1
To uphold jury service citizenship restrictions, without producing a
loss of confidence in the jury system, courts must find that something
about citizenship classifications is different from other classifications
subject to strict scrutiny. Precedents concerning exclusions of
non-citizens from jury service identify two possible differences.
The first arises from the state interest that the courts find justifies an
alienage classification for jury service-a state interest in ensuring
that jurors are both committed to the enforcement of this country's
laws and familiar with this country's customs. 69 This state interest
rests on an assumption that non-citizens as a class are less likely to be
loyal to this country's laws or familiar with this country's customs. 7
The assumption about the loyalty (or lack thereof) of non-citizens
is not sufficiently strong to be a distinction that would justify the
difference in treatment between non-citizens and other groups subject
to strict scrutiny. As previously discussed, many factors suggest that
most legal permanent residents are just as committed to this country
and its laws as the average citizen.'
The assumption that non-citizens are less likely to be familiar with
the customs, values, and institutions of this country may be a more
meritorious distinction to justify upholding exclusions of non-citizens
from jury service even while other exclusions are subject to close
judicial scrutiny and struck down. Both native-born and naturalized
citizens have the opportunity to learn about the customs of this
country. Native-born citizens, and naturalized citizens who are
schooled in the United States, receive this knowledge in "classes in
civics, United States and [state] history, and principles of American
government" provided in public and private schools.172 Naturalized
citizens have demonstrated knowledge of the customs of this country,
because "a knowledge and understanding of the fuindamentals of the
168 See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), summarily
aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976); State v. Garza, 492 N.W.2d 32, 47-48 (Neb. 1992).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 976 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing
Perkins, 370 F. Supp. at 142 (Winter, J., concurring)); Perkins, 370 F. Supp. at 136 (majority
opinion).
170 Perkins, 370 F. Supp. at 138.
171 See supra Part hIA. ; see also Legomsky, supra note 130, at 295-96 (discussing
allegiance as a purpose of citizenship and describing reasons why resident aliens cannot be
assumed to be disloyal).
172 Anbach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78 n.8 (1979).
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history, and of the principles and form of government, of the United
States" is a requirement for naturalization.173 In contrast, non-citizens
who have not attended school in the United States have likely not had
the opportunity to learn about American government in school and,
until naturalization examinations, have no way of demonstrating the
requisite knowledge about U.S. customs, laws, and institutions.
However, as Judge Winter, concurring in Perkins, stated, resident
aliens could serve on juries if their eligibility was conditioned upon
"their successful completion of examinations comparable to those
administered by the Bureau of Immigration and Natuiralization."174
Since alienage is a classification requiring close judicial scrutiny,
administrative inconvenience of such examinations is an insufficient
reason to maintain an exclusion from jury service of all resident
aliens.175 Thus, the likelihood that non-citizens are less familiar with
the customs and institutions of this country is insufficient alone to
justify the continued exclusion of non-citizens from jury service.
Public confidence in the jury system would suffer if non-citizen
exclusions were based only on this likelihood or the assumption that
non-citizens are less likely to be committed to this country's laws.
In contrast, the second potential difference between the alienage
classification and other classifications requiring strict scrutiny
analysis could justify the exclusion of non-citizens from jury service.
This difference arises because of the relevance of citizenship to
political participation. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has
held that there are "political function" exceptions to the requirement
that alienage classifications face close scrutiny.176 The basis for this
exception is the finding that states have the power to define their
"'6political community"". 77 and to "exclude aliens from participation
in [their] democratic political institutions."'178 In the determination of
a political community, citizenship also holds significance at the
national level. This significance is partly shown in the Constitution,
which provides that citizenship is a requirement for the office of
173 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(2) (2006). See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S.
Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L. L. 237, 252 (1994) (listing the criteria for naturalization
in the United States).
174 Perkins, 370 F. Supp. at 140 (Winter, J., concurring).
1751d Even so, Judge Winter concurred with the majority in upholding the statute
excluding resident aliens from jury service because of the state's interest in restricting jury
service to those comm-itted to applying the laws of the United States and the lack of an objective
test of commitment for non-citizens. Id at 141-42.
176 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984) (describing the political function
exception); see also supra Part I (same).
177 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 344 (1972)).
178Md. at 648 (citing Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-34 (1904)).
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President179 and for positions in the Senate' 8 0 and the House of
Representatives.'18 ' Additionally, the Constitution provides for the
protection of certain "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States."' 82 The importance of citizenship is also evident in
Congress's power "to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."' 8 3
Congress has the "power to define the extent of resident aliens' rights
prior to obtaining citizenship." 8  Therefore, at both the state
and federal level, support exists for the relevance of citizenship
to political participation. 185 The importance placed on a political
community presents a reasonable distinction for excluding
non-citizens from jury service while other groups subject to strict
scrutiny are not excluded.186 Thus, exclusions of non-citizens from
jury service can be justified and likely will not be viewed as invidious
discrimination resulting in a decrease in public confidence in the
judicial system.
2. Jury Representativeness as a Concern for Community Confidence
in the Jury System
Alternatively, the prohibition of non-citizens from jury service
could create a loss of confidence in the judicial system if it is an
impermissible systematic exclusion that decreases the representative
quality of the jury. As early as 1946, the Supreme Court emphasized
that a jury had to be drawn from a jury pool broadly representative of
the community.187 However, the jury does not have to be drawn from
a segment of the community that includes every possible group. The
representative quality of a jury is not so much about the groups
themselves, but about the attitudes and viewpoints of the groups.18 8
179U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1, cl. 5.
180 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, ci. 2.
181 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, ci. 3.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18 US CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 4; see also United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972,
977-78 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing to this Constitutional provision as a source of Congress's
authority to limit jury service to citizens).
184Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d at 978.
185 See infra Part II.C. 1, for a discussion of whether this accepted connection between
citizenship and democratic political participation is appropriate for the role of the jury to the
juror himself.
18 6 For this reason, although this Note focuses on policy concerns and does not tackle the
constitutionality question directly, the constitutionality of exclusions of non-citizens from jury
service is likely secure.
'
87 Kalt, supra note 92, at 77-80. However, the Court later stated that '"[tlhe Sixth
Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a
representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it
does)."' Id at 80 (quoting Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990)) (alteration in original).
188 Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 598 (Cal. 1979).
750 Vol. 59:3
2009] REASSESSING JURY SER VICE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMEffNTS 751
The representation of the community may occur in this way, because,
as the Supreme Court stated, "'States remain free to prescribe relevant
qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so
long as it may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are
representative of the community."",89 The Court's established test for
a fair cross section violation reflects this conception of a jury's
representation of the community through attitudes and viewpoints
rather than group memberships-the exclusion of a group creates a
fair cross section violation only if the group is "a 'distinctive' group
in the community." 90 Even if a prima facie case of a fair cross section
violation is found, a state may justify the fair cross section violation,
and thus the decreased representativeness, with a significant state
interest.' 9 '
If non-citizens comprise a distinctive group in the community,
public confidence in the jury system could be harmed by the
exclusion of non-citizens from jury service. The Supreme Court has
not stated what qualities make a group distinct,192 but "a common
court of appeals definition has emerged" 93: the group must be
defined by some factor; the group must possess "'a common thread or
basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience"'~; and the members of
the group must share interests that "'.cannot be adequately represented
if the group is excluded from the jury selection process.""9
Non-citizens definitely meet the first requirement, since they are
defined by their non-citizenship status. The California Supreme Court
addressed the other two factors in Rubio v. Superior Court.195
The majority found that non-citizens had the shared experiences
of exclusion from this country's political processes and of
discrimination.196 However, the majority found that non-citizens were
adequately represented by naturalized citizens, who had similar
experiences as non-citizens before naturalization. 19 Justice Tobriner
thought otherwise, arguing in his dissent that naturalized citizens and
non-citizens have different outlooks due to the passage of time, so
189M. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). However, there are
criticisms of the adequate representation factor. See, e.g., id at 604-06 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting); Kalt, supra note 92, at 84.
190Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
19'1. at 367-68.
192 Kalt, supra note 92, at 82 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986)).
194M. at 82 (quoting Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
195 593 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1979).
196 MI. at 598.
19M at 599-600.
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adequate representation of non-citizens by naturalized citizens is
unlikely. 198
If, as Justice Tobriner argued, the representation of non-citizens by
naturalized citizens is inadequate, thus revealing that non-citizens
constitute a distinctive group, then the exclusion of non-citizens from
jury service would make a prima facie case of a fair cross section
violation.199 However, the governmnent, at either a state or federal
level, could justify this limitation on the representative quality of the
jury with a significant state interest. As stated above, states have the
power to "exclude aliens from participation in [their] democratic
political institutions, 200 and Congress has the power "to define the
extent of resident aliens' rights prior to obtaining citizenship. 1
Thus, even when the representative quality of the jury is concerned,
exclusions of non-citizens probably will be deemed to not affect
public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.
Non-citizens might not comprise a distinct group whose viewpoint
will not be represented if the group is not available in the jury pool;
but, even if the absence of non-citizens does subtract a certain
viewpoint from the jury pool, the absence can be justified to the
public.
3. Implications for the Presence of Other Groups on the Jury as
Concerns for Community Confidence in the Jury System
In the previous discussion of the reasons for how exclusions of
non-citizens from jury service could possibly decrease public
confidence in the criminal justice system, only the presence or
absence of non-citizens on the jury was considered. However,
exclusions of groups from jury service could potentially decrease
public confidence in the jury system through the effects that the
exclusion might have on other groups eligible to serve on juries. This
effect has been observed and considered in exclusions of felons from
202jury service. Felon exclusions from jury service contribute to racial
disparity on juries by disqualifying a greater percentage of African
American adults than the percentage of the entire adult population
1"8Id. at 606 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
"
99The exclusion of non-citizens satisfies the other prongs of the Duren test,
underrepresentation of the group and systematic exclusion of the group. See Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
200 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973) (citing Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621,
632-34 (1904)).
2(1 United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 978 (5th Cir. 1975).
M02 See Kalt, supra note 92, at 113-14.
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that is disqualified due to felon exclusions. 0 Despite the disparate
racial impact of felon exclusions from jury service, felon exclusions
have been upheld against both fair cross section challenges 204 and
equal protection challenges. 0
Citizenship requirements for jury service have also been viewed
as a cause of racial disparity on juries. The underrepresentation
of Hispanics on juries in some communities is attributed to the
citizenship requirement as well as many other factors, including the
English language requirement. 0 For example, in one case involving
a fair cross section challenge based on Hispanic underrepresentation,
the court found that a 14.5 percent absolute disparity existed between
the percentage of over-eighteen Hispanics in the population of the
county and the percentage of Hispanics on the master trial jury list.207
Despite the disparity, the court rejected the challenge. 0 The court
recognized that citizenship requirements were a cause of the absolute
disparity,209 but when the percentage of Hispanics on the master trial
jury list was compared to the percentage of 'jury-eligible" (i.e., U.S.
citizen) Hispanics in the county, any remaining underrepresentation
was insufficient for a Sixth Amendment fair cross section violation.21
0
Additionally, the court found that the county's jury selection method
did not systematically exclude jury-eligible HsaCS211
Although citizenship requirements for jury service may be
one cause of Hispanic underrepresentation on juries in certain
communities, this effect likely should not interfere with public
confidence in the jury system. Racial disparities on juries should most
likely produce a decline of public confidence in the jury system if
they are the result of intentional discrimination against the group
203 Id. at 114.
204Id. at 75 n.34.
205Id. at 8 8.
206 Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and injustice, 25 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REv. 153, 186 (2005); see also Hiroshi Fukurai, Critical Evaluations of Hispanic
Participation on the Grand Jury: Key-Man Selection, Jurymandering, Language, and
Representative Quotas, 5 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 7, 38-39 (2001) (discussing the
underrepresentation of Hispanics on grand juries and noting citizenship requirements as one of
the reasons).
207 Smith v. State, 571 S.E.2d 740, 745 (Ga. 2002).
20ld at 749.
209 See id. at 746; see also Johnson, supra note 206, at 187 ("According to the 2000 U.S.
Census, almost thirty percent of Hispanics in the United States are not U.S. citizens, and thus
are ineligible for jury service.").
210 Smith, 571 S.E.2d at 747. Federal appellate courts have also stated that to determine
whether a group is underrepresented, a court should compare the percentage of the group in the
jury ponl to the percentage of the group in the general jury-eligible population. See United
States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648,
657 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (11 th Cir. 1995).
221 Smith, 571 S.E.2d at 747-49.
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(because the racially disparate impact of a law does not necessarily
indicate a discriminatory purpose 2) or systematic exclusion of the
underrepresented group. Neither is present when considering the
effect of citizenship requirements on Hispanic underrepresentation on
juries. Such a requirement is not racially discriminatory on its face,
and the long history of statutes restricting jury service to citizens213
clearly shows that the exclusion of Hispanics is not a purpose of the
citizenship requirement. 1  Also, courts have held that
underrepresentation of Hispanics on juries does not result from
systematic exclusion if the only cause is a citizenship requirement,
without any affirmative effort to impede members of that group from
215
serving as jurors. Because Hispanic underrepresentation is
attributable to longstanding jury citizenship requirements that are
some of many accepted citizenship requirements related to political
21participation, 16this effect should not create a decrease in public
confidence in the jury system overall that would recommend
non-citizen participation on juries .217 The exclusion of non-citizens
from jury service probably does not conflict with the jury's role of
creating public confidence in the criminal justice system, either
through the absence of non-citizens from juries or through effects that
non-citizen exclusions may have on the presence of eligible groups
for jury service.21
212 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) ("[W]e have not held that a law, neutral
on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race
than of another."); Kalt, supra note 92, at 89-90 (stating that it would be difficult to challenge,
on disparate racial impact grounds, felon exclusions from jury service because it would be
difficult to show discriminatory intent).
213 See supra Part I.
2 14 Cjf Kalt, supra note 92, at 91 (stating that because "felon exclusion was practiced at
common law," attributing "racial animus to the historical practice of felon exclusion is
difficult").
215 Smith, 571 S.E.2d at 747.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 176-85.
217 it is still possible that the underrepresenitation of Hispanics on juries decreases Hispanic
confidence in the jury system, see Johnson, supra note 206, at 196, but whether removing jury
service citizenship requirements is the right cure for the underrepresentation is another matter.
218 separate question is whether the presence of non-citizens on juries would actually
decrease public confidence in the jury system. The presence of non-citizens on juries should
only decrease public confidence if non-citizens are unable to perform the jury's function, as
identified in Part IIA. 1, of finding facts and applying the law instructed by the judge to those
facts. Knowledge of and loyalty to this country's laws and customs have been considered
necessary for a juror's performance of this function. See discussion supra Part IhA. 1. Although
assumptions that non-citizens lack this requisite knowledge and loyalty exist, these assumptions
are weak, and legal permanent residents are just as capable as citizens of fulfilling the juror's
function. See id. Therefore, the presence of legal permanent residents on juries should not
decrease public confidence in the criminal justice system.
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C The Role of the Jury for the Jurors Themselves
Two main purposes of jury service for the jurors themselves are
firequently discussed. First, jury service provides jurors an opportunity
for democratic participation in government. Second, jury service
supplies jurors with civic education.
1. The Jury as an Opportunity for Democratic Participation in
Government
As described by the Supreme Court, the "opportunity for ordinary
citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been
recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury
system."219 A comparison of jury service and enfranchisement as
institutions of political participation is often made. 2 In making this
comparison, the Court stated that "with the exception of voting, for
most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process."221
One scholar has even described jury service as "the pinnacle of
democratic participation. 222 This opportunity for democratic
participation is not only described as a right to sit on a jury and
administer justice, but also as a duty.223
The role of jury service as a right and duty to participate in the
administration of justice has been identified by the Supreme Court as
one reason for the representative character of the jury, or the fair cross
section requirement. 2  Yet, however great the jury's representative
character has expanded over the years through courts holding that
distinctive groups previously prohibited from jury service should not
be systematically excluded, the representative character of the jury
has not become great enough to include non-citizens. 2 This
219 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
147-58 (1968)).
22Se Vikramn David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 203, 205-06 (1995) (listing many recognitions of the link between voting and
jury service).
221 Powers, 499 U.S. at 407.
222 Kalt, supra note 92, at 129. However, it is widely recognized that individuals do not
usually view a call to jury service in such a rosy light. See ABRAMSON, supra note 95, at 248-49
(stating that jury avoidance is widespread); JONAKAIT, supra note 3, at 125-26 (same); Kalt,
supra note 92, at 119 (stating that individuals find jury service distasteful).
223 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (describing the "duty, honor, and privilege of jury
service"); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) ("Jury service is a duty as well as a
privilege of citizenship .. 1)
22 4 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975)).
22 5
See Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court), summarily
aff-d, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
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exclusion fits with the current conception of jury service as
democratic participation, which, as shown by the Supreme Court's
statements cited above, is viewed as a right or duty of citizens.
Similarly, non-citizens are excluded from voting, the other main
opportunity for political and democratic participation.1 26  Legal
scholars have argued for separating the perceived connection between
citizenship and voter enfranchisement and thereby allowing some
non-citizens to vote.22 It is useful to consider two of the main
arguments for enfranchisement in determining whether a similar
proposition should be made for the dismantling of the perceived
connection between citizenship and democratic participation through
jury service, and thus for the inclusion of some non-citizens on juries.
One of the arguments provided for the extension of the vote to
legal permanent residents is the membership of legal permanent
residents in the communities in which they live. The participation of
legal permanent residents in their communities causes legal
permanent residents to have an interest in political decisions just as
citizens have. 228 This interest arises because legal permanent residents
are subject to the same "social and political responsibilities" as
citizens; "[ilmmigrants are subject to all laws, pay taxes at all levels,
work in and own businesses, send their children to schools, serve in
the military and can be drafted, and participate in all aspects of daily
social life."229 Long-standing democratic principles provide that
individuals should not be governed or taxed without the opportunity
for representation. 3
Because democratic participation in the form of jury service is
different from democratic participation in the form of voting, the
interest in a community that non-citizens gain from their residence
and obligations therein may not suggest a need for the opportunity to
perform jury service as much as it suggests a need for representation
through the vote. Unlike the vote, through which an individual has the
opportunity to have input in the formation of the law either directly
through referenda or indirectly by electing the lawmakers, jury
service does not provide individuals in a community the same level of
representation. As discussed earlier, the jury's function is not to have
226 Raskin, supra note 137, at 1394.
227 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People ":Alien Suffr~age in German and
American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 259 (1992); Raskin, supra note 137; Rosberg,
supra note 130.229 Evia, supra note 135, at 170.
29d;see also JEFFERYS & MONGER, supra note 135, at I (explaining that legal
permanent residents may "live and work permanently anywhere in the United States, own
property, and attend public schools").230Raskin, supra note 137, at 1443-45.
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a voice in the formation of the law but to apply the laws that already
exist in the community.23'1 This role-an opportunity to participate in
the administration of justice through the application of law-is not as
effective at influencing matters directly affecting an individual's
interest in the community as is voting. The difference between
democratic participation through voting and democratic participation
through jury service is reflected in distinctions between voting and
jury service as rights of citizens. Voting has been described as "a
more robust right."2 32 The U.S. Constitution repeatedly discusses the
right to vote but does not provide a right to serve on a jury.23
Additionally, while individuals have the right to vote (or not vote)
when they choose, individuals only have a right to a fair opportunity
at jury service; whether an individual is chosen for jury service is a
matter of chance.23 These differences in quality of right are
indications that the proposal for extending the right to vote to certain
non-citizens on account of their interest in the community cannot
necessarily be applied to jury service.
Another argument for the extension of the franchise to some
non-citizens is the historical disconnect between citizenship and
voting, which suggests the right to vote is not solely for citizens. An
extensive history of alien suffrage exists in many states.23 The ls
state to eliminate non-citizen voting did so in 1926.23 Not only have
non-citizens been voting through much of this country's history, but
the disconnect between voting and citizenship status is made stronger
by limitations placed on citizens' voting. Currently, there are age and
237
residency qualifications to vote, and sm states disenfranchise
felons .238 Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that "citizenship
and suffrage are independent legal categories which do not
necessarily imply one another. 23 9
Unlike the extensive history of non-citizen voting, the history of
jury service by non-citizens is not as strong. Although in the early
part of the nineteenth century non-citizens did sit on juries de
medietate linguae convened for trials of non-citizens, the jury de
231 See supra Part IIA.
232 Kalt, supra note 92, at 120.
231d (citing U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI).
234 1dat 119-20.
135 See generally Neuman, supra note 227, at 292-300; Raskin, supra note 137, at 1397-
417.
2 36 Raskin, supra note 137, at 1416.
237 See, e.g., OHlO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.01 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009).
238 Kalt, supra note 92, at 120.
239 Raskin, supra note 137, at 1417 (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162
(1874)).
758 ~CA SE WESTERN RESER VE LA W RE VIEW [o.5:
medietate linguae was a right of the non-citizen on trial rather than
the non-citizens serving. 240 Even the service of non-citizens on juries
de mediet ate linguae declined rapidly as courts began to reject
requests by non-citizens for these types of juries .2 4t' The connection
between citizenship and jury service has historically been stronger
than the connection between citizenship and voting.
The main arguments for revision of the view that democratic
participation in the form of voting is solely a right for citizens cannot
be similarly extended to democratic participation in the form of jury
service. This finding, in combination with the principle expounded by
the Supreme Court that states have the power to define their political
community by "exclud[ing] aliens from participation in [their]
,,242 ecuino
democratic political institutions, incaeththexluon f
non-citizens from jury service does not conflict with the role of the
jury as an opportunity for democratic participation by the juror.
2. The Educational Purpose of Jury Service for Jurors
The second major purpose of jury service particular to the jurors
themselves is civic education. In the 1 830s, Alexis de Tocqueville
stated:
I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who are in
litigation; but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who
decide the litigation; and I look upon it as one of the most
efficacious means for the education of the people which
society can employ. 4
Not only is jury service an opportunity for individuals to learn about
the law first-hand,244 but it also teaches a range of other values. De
Tocqueville described some of these lessons, such as "teach [ing] men
equity in practice," teaching individuals "not to shirk responsibility
for [their] own acts," and making "men feel that they have duties
toward society." 245 When de Tocqueville was discussing the values of
jury service, he seemed to do so with respect to citizens.24 However,
240 See supra Part 1.
241 Id
24 2 Sugarnman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 648 (1973) (citingPope v. Williams, i93 U. S. 62 1,
632-34 (1904)).
243 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 337 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Schocken Books 1961), quoted in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,407 (1991).
244 Kalt, supra note 92, at 128.
245 1 ALEXIS DE TocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (J.P. Mayer cd., George
Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969), quoted in Marder, supra note 4, at 1053.
246 See id. ("Juries invest each citizen with a sort of magisterial office; they make all men
feel that they have duties toward society and that they take a share in its government."), quoted
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the lessons that jury service provides are beneficial to all individuals,
citizen and non-citizen alike.
This educative experience is not only beneficial for the juror but
also for the larger community. First, an individual's involvement in
other civic and political behaviors may increase subsequent to his jury
service participation. One study found that registered voters who
participated in criminal juries that deliberated and reached verdicts
were more likely to vote in subsequent elections more often than
jurors who did not deliberate or reach a verdict.247 The study also
showed that "a conclusive deliberative experience raises future voting
rates above those expected based on prior voting history. 4  Later
research suggests that the effect of jury service is not limited to an
increase in voting rates. Jurors who consider their jury experience
rewarding are more likely to demonstrate other increased civic and
political behaviors after their jury experience. 249 Second, surveys and
polls indicate that individuals have a favorable impression of juries
after serving as jurors and "have increased confidence in the
legitimacy of the trial system. 250 The benefits that individuals receive
through serving as jurors, much like the lessons mentioned by de
Tocqueville, are generally discussed specifically with regard to
citizens.251 However, perhaps these benefits could extend equally to
non-citizens if they were able to receive the civic education provided
by jury service.
The first benefit that accrues from the education jurors receive-an
increase in civic participation-may be partially unavailable to
non-citizens who serve on juries. The decrease in this benefit arises
simply because non-citizen voting rates cannot increase after
non-citizen jury service, since, for the most part, U.S. citizenship is a
requirement for voting.25 However, since voting is not the only civic
participation that increases after an individual performs jury service,
non-citizens should be able to partake in the educational civic
in Marder, supra note 4, at 1053.
1
4
1 John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection Between
Jury Deliberation and Political Participation, 64 J. POL. 585, 592 (2002).
248]d at 593.
249 John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing
the Civic Value of Institutionalized Deliberation, 34 POL'Y STUD. J. 605, 614 (2006).
2 5
0 JoNAK~T, supra note 3, at 83.
251 See Gastil & Weiser, supra note 249, at 619 ("[T]he Court views jury service
as a means of affording every citizen the chance . .. to see the inner workings of the justice
system ... )252 Raskin, supra note 137, at 1394. Whether the fr-anchise should be extended to
non-citizens is beyond the scope of this Note, except for the discussion in Part l1.C.1 of the
relevance of arguments for non-citizen voting to non-citizen jury service.
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experience of jury service. Since "people who have joined us on our
land are generally here to stay, 253 they should be encouraged to
integrate into the community, which includes involvement in civic
activities. This is particularly true of the millions of legal permanent
residents who have lived in the country for many years and who are
eligible for naturalization. If these legal permanent residents are
eligible for jury service, they can benefit from the civic education
attributable to jury service, which can lead to increased civic
participation and thus further integration into the community.
The second benefit that accrues from the education jury service
provides for jurors, confidence in and a favorable impression of the
jury as an institution, is important for any individual. All individuals,
both citizens and non-citizens, can benefit from seeing how
administration of justice occurs through the jury. Both citizens and
non-citizens live in a community in which they learn of jury verdicts
through the news, and both are subject to the criminal justice system,
of which the jury is a part. Therefore, both citizens and non-citizens
have an interest in the opportunity to see how the jury works to
achieve a fair outcome so that they can have confidence in the
administration of justice in their community. Since the same benefits
of an educational civic experience can occur if non-citizens have the
opportunity to receive that education, non-citizen jury service is
compatible with the educational role of the jury for the juror.
111. SHOULD NON-CITIZENS BE ELIGIBLE FOR JURY SERVICE IN LIGHT
OF THE JURY's ROLES?
The above analysis of the jury's roles for the accused, the
community as a whole, and the jurors themselves does not provide a
clear answer to the question of whether non-citizens should be
eligible for jury service. However, a consideration of non-citizen jury
service with respect to these roles does shed light on the issues
surrounding the question.
Just as jury service by non-citizens is not unconstitutional, the
roles that a jury fulfills will not be harmed if non-citizens serve as
jurors. If non-citizens serve on juries, juries will still serve the role of
protecting the accused from arbitrary and oppressive government. 5
Despite assumptions that non-citizens lack the knowledge of and
loyalty to this country's laws and customs necessary for jury service,
non-citizens, or at least certain groups of non-citizens, will be able to
perform the juror's functions of finding facts and applying the law as
253Id. at 1466.
2
1
4 See discussion supra Part IL.A.
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instructed by the judge to those facts.25 Additionally, the presence of
non-citizens on a jury will not decrease the jury's representation of
the common sense of the community, because citizenship is an
arbitrary and inaccurate measure of an individual's knowledge of
community customs. 256 Likewise, jury service by non-citizens will not
conflict with the jury's role for the community of providing public
confidence in the criminal justice system. Since non-citizens, or at
least certain groups of non-citizens, can capably perform jurors' tasks
despite assumptions to the contrary, public confidence in the criminal
justice system should not decrease as a result of certain non-citizen
jury service. 257 Finally, the presence of non-citizens on juries will not
reduce the jury's role for jurors themselves; jurors will still have the
opportunity to participate in democratic self-government and to
receive a civic education. 5
Although the jury's roles will not be compromised by non-citizen
jury service, these roles do not forcefully support the inclusion of
non-citizens on juries. Despite the absence of non-citizens, juries can
still fulfill most of their roles. The present exclusion of non-citizens
from jury service likely does not affect the jury's role for the
community by diminishing public confidence in the criminal justice
system considering the widely recognized relevance of citizenship to
political participation as seen in provisions of the Constitution and
courts' recognition of a state's interest in defining its political
community.259 Likewise, the jury's role as a democratic opportunity
for the jurors themselves does not unduly suffer due to the absence of
non-citizens from juries. While jury service provides individual jurors
an opportunity for democratic participation, similar to the right to
vote, the many arguments for allowing non-citizens to vote do not
successfully support the extension of jury service to non-citizens. 6
Only the second role of the jury for jurors themselves, the provision
of a civic education, will be enhanced if non-citizens are eligible for
jury service-all individuals benefit from a civic education, and
society as a whole reaps the benefits of a civically-educated
populace.21 However, even though the jury's educative role could be
enhanced by the inclusion of non-citizens in the jury pool, the
absence of non-citizens does not prevent the jury from fulfilling this
255 See discussion supra Part hIA. 1.
256 See discussion supra Part 11.A.2.
257 See discussion supra note 218.
258 See discussion supra Part I.C.
259 See discussion supra Part IB.
2
60See discussion supra Part I11G. 1.
261 See discussion supra Part 1I.C.2.
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role. The benefits of the educative jury experience will still accrue to
those individuals randomly selected to serve as jurors.
However, the jury's role of protecting the accused from oppressive
and arbitrary government might be served better by including some
non-citizens in the jury pool. One of the ways in which the jury
protects the defendant is by representing the common sense of the
community, and this representation would be most accurate if
members of most, or even all, groups are allowed to serve as jurors. 22
In some jurisdictions, the inclusion of non-citizens in the jury pool
will greatly increase the ability of the jury to represent the common
sense of the community more completely.
As stated by the Supreme Court, "[c]ommunities differ at
different times and places. What is a fair cross section at one time or
place is not necessarily a fair cross section at another time or a
different place." 6  Additionally, states have broad discretion to set
qualifications for jurors as long as the jury pool is representative
264
of the community. In sm locations, the inclusion of some
non-citizens in the jury pool would significantly help maintain
the representativeness of the jury.
The foreign-born and non-citizen populations in the United States
are not distributed equally geographically. According to the 2000
U.S. Census, 11.1 percent of the U.S. population is composed
of individuals who are foreign-born, meaning that they are either
non-citizens or naturalized citizens .26 5  Of this foreign-born
population, 40.3 percent are naturalized U.S. citizens. 6 Therefore,
about 6.6 percent of the total U.S. population consists of non-citizens.
"More than one-half of the foreign-born population live[s] in three
states: California, New York, and Texas."26 7 In California, 26.2
percent of the total population is foreign-born .268 Of the foreign-born
population in California, 39.2 percent is composed of naturalized
citizens .269 Therefore, about 15.9 percent of the population in
California is composed of non-citizens, a much larger percentage
than the overall percentage of non-citizens in the United States.
This uneven distribution of foreign-born and non-citizens is also
262 Sediscussion supra Part 11.A.2.
263 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S, 522, 537 (1975).
2641d. at 538.
265 NOLAN MALONE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION: 2000, at 1 (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs
/c2kbr-34.pdf.
266Id. at 2.
267Id. at 4.
268 Id. at 3.
269Id
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apparent on a county-by-county basis. In 2000, 22 percent of the total
foreign-born population in the United States was concentrated in only
four counties holding 6.8 percent of the total U.S. population. 270 Data
of this sort suggest that in certain jurisdictions juries might not
adequately represent the common sense of the community if all non-
citizens are excluded from the jury pool.
But not all non-citizens should be qualified to serve on juries
regardless of immigration status. Legal permanent residency should
be a qualification for non-citizens to serve on juries. Legal permanent
resident status provides non-citizens the possibility to live and work
in the United States permanently, allowing them to remain in a
community and be more than just "current"' residents.27 1 As discussed
earlier, legal permanent residents are integrated into communities in a
variety of ways.27 Legal permanent residents' integration into a
community allows them to understand and contribute to the common
sense of the community. Including legal permanent residents in the
jury pool will increase the ability of the jury to fully represent the
common sense of the community, thereby improving the jury's role of
protecting the accused in a criminal trial.27
Despite the benefits to jury representativeness that including legal
permanent residents in the jury pool will provide, any proposal to
make legal permanent residents eligible for jury service still faces the
obstacles of a state's interest in defining its "political community"
and power to exclude all non-citizens from political participation. 7
But a state may choose whether to exercise this interest and power.
States, particularly those with higher percentages of legal permanent
residents, should consider expanding their conception of their
political community to allow legal permanent residents to serve as
jurors. Such a change in the view of the political community would
not be unprecedented. For example, many efforts have been made at
both state and municipal levels to allow non-citizens to vote in local
elections. 7 Some of these efforts have been successful. In Maryland,
six municipalities allow residents, whether citizen or non-citizen,
270Id. at 9.
271 JEFFERYS & MONGER, supra note 135, at 1; Evia, supra note 135, at 151.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 135-37, 152-53.
273 More selective groups of non-citizens discussed briefly earlier in this Note, see supra
text accompanying notes 138-42--such as legal permanent residents who have lived in the
United States for a certain period of time, legal permanent residents who have applied for
naturalization, or legal permanent residents selected on an individual basis-would likely
present significant administrative hurdles.
27
4 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 648 (1973).
27
5 See Immigrant Voting Project, Immigrant Voting Rights Movements and Practices
Update January 2006, http://www.immigrantvoting.org/statescuffentIU~overview.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2009).
764 ~CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW WRE VIEW [o.5:
to vote in local elections. 7 In Chicago, any parents, regardless
of citizenship status, with children in public schools may vote
in school site council elections. 7 Thus, municipalities have
reconsidered and redefined conceptions of their political community
to allow non-citizens to vote.
Many of the arguments for expansion of the franchise to
non-citizens focus on non-citizens' participation in communities
as a reason to give non-citizens the opportunity for democratic
278
political participation. Asdsused previously, these arguments
based on inherent rights to democratic participation do not extend
smoothly to non-citizen jury service .2 79 However, reasoning based on
the opportunity for democratic political participation is not the only
basis on which states should reconsider whether to expand their
political community to include legal permanent residents in the
jury pool. The need to ensure a jury adequately represents the
community's common sense should counsel states, especially those
with larger populations of legal permanent residents, to reevaluate
their views of who to include in the jury pool and, at a minimum, to
consider making those legal permanent residents eligible for jury
service.
CONCLUSION
Citizenship requirements for jury service have not attracted much
attention, certainly not nearly as much attention as citizenship
requirements for voting or for civil service positions at the state or
federal level .280 But citizenship requirements for jury service deserve
attention. The jury is not a static institution: selection procedures and
qualification requirements for jury service have evolved over the
years. The state of citizenship requirements should be reevaluated as
part of the continuing evolution of the jury.
Although the current established consensus excludes all non-
citizens from jury service, the finding by courts that non-citizen jury
276 Immigrant Voting Project, Immigrant Voting Rights in Maryland,
http://www immigrantvoting.org/statescurrent/maryland.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
2 7 
mmigrant Voting Project, Immigrant Voting Rights in Chicago,
http://www.inimigrantvoting.org/statescurrent/Chicago.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
278 See Raskin, supra note 137, at 1443-45 (discussing the concerns of taxation and
governance without representation); see also Rachel L. Swarns, Immigrants Raise Cailfor Right
to Be Voters, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2004, at A 13 (quoting advocates of non-citizen voting who
raise the call of"[n]o taxation without representation!").279 See discussion supra Part IC. 1.
280 Peter H. Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIOR. L.J. 1,
13-14 (1997). But see Johnson, supra note 206, at 186-89 (discussing citizenship requirements
for jury service).
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service is not unconstitutional allows consideration of whether policy
reasons exist for including at least some groups of non-citizens in the
jury pool. A look at the traditional roles of the jury for the defendant,
the community as a whole, and the jurors provides insight to this
question. The presence of non-citizens on juries would not conflict
with any of these roles. At the same time, most of these roles do not
suffer from the absence of non-citizens from the jury pool. However,
the jury's representation of the common sense of the community, a
feature that helps the jury fulfill its role for the defendant, may be
more adequate and complete if legal permanent residents are able
to serve as jurors. Such representation of legal permanent residents
on juries is probably most critical in states with the largest
populations of legal permanent residents. Therefore, non-citizens
should not be summarily excluded from jury service without
consideration of whether, in some communities, the presence of some
groups of non-citizens would enhance the operation of the jury as a
representative protective body for the criminal defendant.
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